Why do similar households end up with very different levels of wealth? We show that differences in the attitudes and skills with which they approach nancial planning are a signi cant factor. We use new and unique survey data to assess these differences and to measure each household's "propensity to plan." We show that those with a higher such propensity spend more time developing nancial plans, and that this shift in planning is associated with increased wealth. These ndings are consistent with broad psychological evidence concerning the bene cial impacts of planning on goal pursuit. Those with a high propensity to plan may be better able to control their spending, and thereby achieve their goal of wealth accumulation. We nd direct evidence supporting this effortful self-control channel in the very strong relationship we uncover between the propensity to plan and budgeting behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Households with similar economic and demographic characteristics accumulate radically different amounts of wealth.
1 In the context of the life-cycle hypothesis, natural explanations are based on divergent preferences. Differences in discount factors and bequest motives are particularly obvious candidates. We would expect patient households to accumulate more wealth than impatient households due to their lesser desire for current consumption. Differences in risk aversion may also be important, since the returns on wealth are strongly in uenced by the will-ingness to take nancial risks. For example, given the remarkably high return on equities over the 1990s, we would expect those with lower levels of risk aversion to have accumulated signi cantly more wealth by the end of the decade.
While preference-based explanations for wealth differentials hold theoretical promise, they have not been found to be of great empirical value. Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg [2001] found that differences in discount factors were of little value in explaining wealth differentials. Their technique of measurement was indirect, and involved inferring discount factors from rates of consumption growth. Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro [1997] took an entirely different approach, using direct survey techniques to measure key preference parameters, including the discount factor, the rate of risk aversion, and the bequest motive. Again, these measures did little to explain observed wealth differences.
The profession is left with something of a mystery on its hands. How can households with apparently similar preferences end up with such different levels of wealth? In this paper we focus on differences across households in attitudes and skills related to nancial planning. We show that these differences play a signi cant role in explaining otherwise mysterious wealth differentials.
Our focus on planning is motivated in part by psychological ndings. Ajzen [1991] and Gollwitzer [1996 Gollwitzer [ , 1999 have identi ed speci c planning activities that appear to enhance the probability of achieving prespeci ed personal goals. Could wealth accumulation be just such a goal? The pioneering work of Lusardi [1999 Lusardi [ , 2000 suggests that this question may have an af rmative answer. She found that households that had given little thought to retirement had far lower wealth than those that had given the subject more thought. We investigate two follow-up hypotheses:
1. There exist a set of attitudes and skills that in uence the manner in which any given household approaches to the task of nancial planning: that household's "propensity to plan." 2. Differences across households in the propensity to plan help to explain differential patterns of wealth accumulation. Using new economic, demographic, and behavioral data from two custom-designed surveys, we provide evidence in favor of both hypotheses. We nd that those with a high propensity to 1008
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plan not only accumulate more wealth, but also save more than those with a low such propensity. Moreover, we identify a tight connection between the propensity to plan and the extent to which households set budgets for their overall spending. Furthermore, we nd evidence that many households that set regular budgets regard this activity as contributing to a reduction in their spending.
These results support a theory in which the channel connecting wealth accumulation and the propensity to plan operates through a form of "effortful self-control." We hypothesize that households are sometimes spending at an excessively high rate given their actual preferences and resources. Those with a high propensity to plan both notice this pattern of overspending relatively early, and nd it relatively easy to correct. Those with a low such propensity notice problems later, and nd them more difcult to correct. According to this vision, saving may be as much a matter of skill as of preference.
Our propensity to plan theory represents a signi cant departure from the classical life-cycle model. It is therefore incumbent upon us to consider alternative theories of the relationship between wealth accumulation and planning that are consistent with the classical model. We examine three such theories: that wealth causes planning (reverse causation); that differences in discount rates and other classical preference parameters cause both wealth and planning; and that planning reduces uncertainty concerning future asset returns and future income, which in turn causes wealth to increase. In our data, none of these theories provide a satisfactory explanation for the observed relationship between planning and wealth. Our ndings are not readily explained within the classical life-cycle model of wealth accumulation.
Our ability to test our theory against the alternatives rests on our use of novel data. We are aware of no data source, other than the one we use, rich enough to test our hypotheses concerning the propensity to plan against the various more standard alternatives. It is only because we were able to custom-design two new surveys, one economic and one "behavioral," that we were able to make progress. The behavioral survey was designed in part to provide us with instrumental variables relevant to assessing the direction of causation in the relationship between planning and wealth. Such "designer instruments" may prove useful in identifying the direction of causation in other areas of macroeconomics, and beyond.
II. FOUR THEORIES
In this section we outline four theories that might explain a broad positive relationship between nancial planning and wealth accumulation, beginning with our propensity to plan theory.
II.A. The Propensity to Plan
There are two fundamental hypotheses underlying our vision of how the propensity to plan impacts wealth accumulation.
1. Control Problems: We hypothesize that it is far from straightforward for agents to match long-term motive with current action. They may have an underlying desire to delay consumption to the future, yet nd such a policy somewhat dif cult to put into practice. 2. Control Skills: Agents differ in attitudes and aptitudes of value in overcoming these control problems. The propensity to plan is a re ection of these underlying control skills. There are two different approaches to modeling the rst component of our theory, the control problem.
c Temptation and self-control: An agent with presentbiased preferences, in the sense of Laibson [1997] , may experience a tension between the consumption plan that is most desirable and the consumption plan that is feasible to follow. An agent who is naive in the sense of O'Donoghue and Rabin [1999] may be particularly frustrated by the inability to delay consumption. Even a fully rational and dynamically consistent agent may have to battle with temptation [Gul and Pesendorfer 2001] . Problems are even more extreme for an agent who has an urge to consume that is dif cult to suppress, as in Benhabib and Bisin [2002] and Bernheim and Rangel [2001] . c Bounded rationality and default behavior: Even if preferences are not present-biased, there are many reasons why agents may not continually ne-tune their level of consumption over time. With xed costs of monitoring wealth, consumption may be insensitive to short-term wealth uctuations [Gabaix and Laibson 2001] . Other forms of adjustment cost can rationalize many other forms of inattention and inertia. In psychological terms, this period of inattention may correspond to a period of "automatic" behavior, in the sense analyzed by Bargh and Chartrand [1999] . In such circumstances, there is every reason to expect a gap to develop between ideal and actual consumption choices. The adoption of rigid personal rules may also prevent rapid reaction to changing circumstances [Bé nabou and Tirole 2000] . Given these problems of control, the question arises as to how and when different agents take note of the divergence, and how much effort is involved in recti cation. This is where control skills come into play. Those who are willing and able to actively engage in their nancial affairs, and who keep a careful watch on their patterns of spending, will be best able to notice and to overcome problems associated with excessively high spending. Relevant skills may include technical abilities in the nancial planning arena, monitoring abilities, as well as budgeting skills relevant to ef ciently reducing spending that has become excessive.
Our hypothesis that planning and monitoring may aid in the achievement of a long-term goal such as wealth accumulation has an important precedent in the psychological literature. Extending ideas with deep roots in earlier psychological theory, Gollwitzer has recently outlined a general vision of decision-making in which planning is crucial to the achievement of long-term goals: "My colleagues and I believe that planning helps to alleviate crucial volitional problems of goal achievement, such as being too easily distracted from a goal pursuit or giving up in the face of dif culties when increased effort and persistence are needed instead" [Gollwitzer 1996, p. 287] .
II.B. Reverse Causation
Our theory suggests that variations in planning across individuals may cause differences in wealth. It is possible, however, that causation runs in the opposite direction. Planning may be a by-product of wealth accumulation. Different agents may accumulate different amounts of wealth for reasons unmeasured in our data (for example, due to differences in actual or anticipated inheritances of wealth). In turn, these wealth differences may motivate different levels of planning effort.
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There are many different channels by which wealth shocks might impact planning. It may be that it takes a great deal of additional time to plan a larger portfolio. Wealthy individuals may also have access to more investment opportunities, and therefore need to devote more time to planning. In addition, it may simply be more enjoyable to plan more if one can look forward to a comfortable retirement. These are all reasons why additional wealth may increase the amount of time spent planning. On the other hand, there are forces working in the opposite direction. Those who are less well off may have more to gain in terms of utility from planning activities that increase their ability to use resources ef ciently. In addition, the opportunity cost of time spent planning is increasing in income. Finally, those who are wealthier may be better placed to hire advisors to do their planning for them.
In order to identify the impact of wealth on planning, we would need instruments for wealth. Unfortunately, no such instruments are available. Fortunately, we do have instruments for planning, so that we can isolate the impact of exogenous shocks to planning on wealth.
II.C. Classical Preference Parameters
Planning is plausibly correlated with classical preference parameters. In particular, those who prefer to consume more in later life, to leave larger bequests, or who have stronger precautionary savings motives may be induced to plan more. Moreover, there may be a correlation between the propensity to plan and risk aversion. If those who plan more are also more risk averse, this may induce them to hold more stocks, which may in turn explain divergent paths of wealth accumulation.
II.D. Planning and Uncertainty Reduction
Those who plan may as a result be better informed about both asset returns and future income prospects. There is a strong argument to be made that the resulting reduction in uncertainty about asset returns may, under certain conditions, increase wealth accumulation. In particular, Lillard and Willis [2000] link low knowledge about future stock returns with low stock holding and low rates of return on assets. Their model has the property that an ignorant individual attaches greater subjective uncertainty to stocks than does a knowledgeable one. In certain circumstances, this makes it rational for the ignorant individual to 1012 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS refrain altogether from holding stocks. They nd a measure of precision of beliefs to be positively correlated with stock holding in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). This channel may be of more than theoretical interest. Also using data from the HRS, Lusardi [2000] found that increased planning was associated with an increased probability of stock ownership. Given the higher expected rate of return on stocks, and the actual experience of the 1990s, such a pattern of increased stock holding might explain a large wealth differential.
The case that a planning-induced reduction in uncertainty about future income should increase wealth accumulation is not nearly as strong as that for asset returns. The standard assumption in the consumption literature is that a reduction in uncertainty will decrease wealth accumulation, by reducing the need for precautionary savings. We nd no evidence in our sample to contradict this standard view. If planning improves an individual's knowledge of future income, this would better explain a negative than a positive relationship between planning and wealth.
III. THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

III.A. The Econometric Model
The rst hypothesis de ning the propensity to plan theory concerns the existence of speci c attitudes and skills that in uence nancial planning. The second concerns the positive impact of increases in nancial planning on wealth accumulation. The following simple two-equation econometric model captures these hypotheses:
where w is (log) wealth, p is the reported intensity of planning activity, x is a vector of exogenous individual characteristics affecting both wealth and planning behavior, and z is a vector of characteristics affecting only planning (i.e., the "propensity to plan"). The error terms e w in the wealth equation and e p in the planning equation arise from unobserved shocks and heterogeneity, and are not assumed to be independent. The key predictions of the propensity to plan theory are that 1013
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the coef cients b9 3 in equation (2) and a 2 in equation (1) and are signi cantly different from zero, with a 2 . 0. These coef cients measure, respectively, the impact of the propensity to plan on nancial planning, and the impact of nancial planning on wealth accumulation.
Our three alternative theories can also be identi ed in this framework. They have in common that they rule out a 2 . 0: there is no positive impact of planning on wealth accumulation. In other respects they differ. The reverse causation theory implies that b 2 . 0: it is shifts in wealth that have a positive impact on planning rather than vice versa. The preference parameter theory implies that if the relevant parameters are included in the x-vector of exogenous individual characteristics affecting both wealth and planning behavior, we will nd that the corresponding coef cients in a9 1 and b9 1 are signi cant. Finally, the "knowledge of asset returns" theory of Lillard and Willis [2000] implies that if subjective uncertainty concerning future returns (or actual equity holdings) were to be included in the x-vector, it would have direct explanatory power for both wealth and planning.
III.B. Data Requirements
In order to empirically implement our model, we need data on all of the key variables in equations (1) and (2). These data must satisfy some stringent requirements. Speci cally, in order for the wealth equation to be identi ed, we need our z variables to be uncorrelated with the error terms in both equations, e w and e p . In addition, we need data on actual nancial planning behavior in order to measure p. The other data we need are good measures of total wealth w and a rich set of x variables affecting both wealth and planning behavior. This set of variables should ideally include details on demographic characteristics, education, current income, past and expected future income, as well as measures of preference parameters and of equity holdings.
There is no existing source of data that is adequate to meet our stringent requirements. The most promising "off-the-shelf" data set would appear to be the HRS. This is one of the few surveys that contains information relevant to nancial planning, which explains its central role in the earlier research of Lusardi [1999 Lusardi [ , 2000 . Yet even the HRS has little to contribute with respect to the critical z variables de ning the propensity to plan. This is apparent from the dif culties that Lusardi encountered in her search for instrumental variables appropriate for addressing the issue of reverse causation. She made the identifying assumption that several variables related to family structure, such as the number of older siblings, are uncorrelated with the errors in the wealth equation. The problem is that an individual with older siblings may as a result be subject to current and possible future expenses, and may also anticipate receiving a relatively small inheritance. This would give rise to a greater need to accumulate wealth independent of any effect these events may have on the level of planning.
Overall, the gaps in existing data are so severe that entirely new data are needed to discriminate between the four theories outlined above. We were particularly fortunate to be in a position to gather just such data in two new surveys. As described below, our surveys provide rich details on asset holdings as required for measuring w, a suitably rich set of x variables, several measures of nancial planning, p, and several measures of the propensity to plan, z. Our z variables were deliberately constructed to satisfy the orthogonality conditions necessary for identi cation. In this sense, we used our survey to design instrumental variables wellsuited to establishing the direction of causation in the key empirical relationship.
IV. THE TWO SURVEYS
IV.A. The Sample
We sent two surveys to a sample of TIAA-CREF participants: the Survey of Participant Finances (henceforth SPF), elded in January 2000, and the Survey of Financial Attitudes and Behavior (henceforth FAB), elded in January 2001. The SPF was designed to examine in detail the type and the amount of nancial assets owned by a large group of TIAA-CREF participants. The FAB explored these participants' nancial preferences, expectations, and attitudes.
In this paper we focus attention on wealth accumulation for households in which neither the respondent nor the partner (if applicable) are at or above 65 years of age.
2 Of the 2064 households who lled out the FAB, 1191 satis ed this criterion, and they make up the under-65 universe from which all other samples discussed in the paper are drawn. Note that because early retirement may itself be a consequence of planning-related shifts in wealth, we do not restrict our universe to those who are currently working.
In most of the statistical analyses and regressions in this paper, we limit attention to a subsample of our universe that supplied complete data on all variables of interest. As a rst step in ensuring data completeness, we remove all households receiving life-annuity income from TIAA-CREF from the sample, because it is not clear how to interpret the TIAA-CREF asset values reported by annuitants. Of the 1067 remaining households in the under-65 universe, 513 supplied complete data and could be included in the regression analysis. Of these, we removed from the regression analysis an additional ten with nonpositive net worth, and three extreme outliers with more than $5 million in nancial assets. We refer to the 500 remaining households as the regression sample. Most of our results are based on this sample. In some cases, especially in analyses which do not require complete data on wealth, we make use of most of the 1067 observations in the under-65 universe. Table I shows the basic demographic characteristics of households in both the under-65 universe and in the regression sample. We tabulate answers to questions concerning the respondent's gender, marital status (married, never married, previously married), number of dependent children, and age. We also tabulate educational and occupational characteristics. Note that for most demographic characteristics, there appears to be little difference between the under-65 universe and the regression sample. The regression sample is somewhat younger and contains fewer who are widowed or divorced, possibly due to the removal of annuitants. Table II summarizes households' economic characteristics. Data on earnings are from the FAB in which we asked households to provide estimates of their overall taxable income from employment in 1999.
IV.B. Basic Demographic and Economic Variables
3 The asset and debt information is drawn from the SPF. We record not only the total level of wealth, but also the division between retirement assets and nonretirement assets. Within the non-retirement assets, we separate out real estate wealth, which comprises both owner-occupied and investment assets. With regard to debt, we distinguish between mortgage debt, and all other forms of debt, including credit card and educational debts. The "under-65 universe" is all respondents to the FAB survey who were under age 65 and, if applicable and available, whose spouse reported an age of less than 65 (1191 respondents/households). Some respondents in this sample did not report data for all the above characteristics. The "regression sample" is all individuals in the under-65 universe who (1) provided complete information regarding the demographic characteristics above, (2) provided complete information regarding their household's net worth, (3) provided complete information on their past, present, and expected future labor earnings, (4) have no life annuity income from TIAA-CREF, (5) have positive net worth, and (6) have less than $5 million in gross nancial assets.
It is clear from the table that our sample is far from representative. In particular, respondents are extremely well-educated: the vast majority completed college, and roughly one in three have PhDs. In terms of employment, roughly one in three are teaching faculty, with most of the remainder having manage- Source. Authors' tabulation of 2000 and 2001 survey data. "Gross nancial assets" is the sum of all retirement account balances, mutual funds (except real estate mutual funds), directly held stocks, directly held bonds, checking accounts, savings accounts, and CDs. "Net worth" is total assets minus mortgage debt, outstanding educational loans, outstanding personal loans, and credit card balances. All aggregates exclude the value of real estate mutual funds, whole life insurance policies, trusts, and educational savings accounts (Education IRAs and 529 plans). Respondents were instructed to provide values as of December 31, 1999. Note that these data include only the information reported by respondents on the surveys, and may therefore differ from data reported in Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy [2002] . * For the under-65 universe, statistics are tabulated for all individuals who provided complete data for each individual item (in each row). The number of observations in each row varies, as item response varies. ** The "regression sample" members are the 500 individuals in the under-65 universe who (1) provided complete information regarding the demographic characteristics in Table I above, (2) provided complete information regarding their household's net worth, (3) provided complete information on their past, present, and expected future labor earnings, (4) have no life annuity income from TIAA-CREF, (5) have positive net worth, and (6) have less than $5 million in gross nancial assets.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS ment or professional positions. However, while many of our respondents are well-educated, there are a signi cant number of more "blue-collar" respondents. In particular, the "other" employment category corresponds to secretarial, maintenance, and other support positions.
In terms of the economic characteristics, households in our sample are on average wealthier than the general population. Net worth is some 2.5-3 times higher in our sample than it is among working households in the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Also in contrast with the SCF, the vast majority of households in our sample have signi cant nonretirement nancial assets, and very few have high levels of personal debt.
IV.C. Data Quality
Our data on portfolios of assets and debts are unusually detailed. For example, our survey requests a quantitative division of assets in de ned contribution retirement plans into separate classes, such as cash and equities. 4 Our survey also separates employer-sponsored TIAA-CREF accounts from all other retirement assets (which are themselves broken down into other subcategories) and from nonretirement assets. Within each such category the survey provides for a precise quantitative breakdown describing how much of the total is held in various different forms. At a minimum, these breakdowns allow us to discriminate between cash assets, xed income assets, equities, and other assets. The survey also contains comprehensive numerical questions concerning real estate assets, and all forms of debt. Where relevant, the survey requests information on the assets of the respondent's spouse or partner.
Our item response rates were in excess of 90 percent for most of the larger asset categories. We also had high response rates on the breakdown of these assets among different types of investment instruments. As indicated in Table II , when we look across all of these responses and insist on having suf cient information to calculate net worth, we retain 671 of the 1191 households in the under-65 universe.
Asking quantitative questions and getting quantitative an-swers is not by itself an assurance of high data quality. Greater assurance of accuracy can be found by comparing one of our self-reported data items against accounting records. We have appended accounting information from TIAA-CREF to the survey responses of all respondents with retirement assets at TIAA-CREF. 5 Before comparing the self-reports and accounting numbers, we remove a number of individuals for whom the two numbers are not strictly comparable, for reasons that are institutional in nature. With these issues handled, Table III reports results of a log-log regression of the reported TIAA-CREF asset totals on the accounting totals for the 738 sample households for whom the comparison is relevant, and whose records and self-reports indicated at least $10,000 in TIAA-CREF retirement assets. (We asked respondents to report amounts in thousands; the "greater than $10,000" rule is applied to reduce the in uence of rounding errors.)
The coef cient on the TIAA-CREF accounting data is extremely close to one, while the constant term is extremely close to zero, suggesting a very high correlation between the self-reports and the accounting data. The average absolute deviation between the response and the accounting data is on the order of 10 percent, while the median is less than 2 percent. We note that 5. The anonymity and con dentiality of the survey respondents has been, and continues to be, strictly enforced and maintained. The identities of speci c respondents remain unknown to all of the investigators. Source. Authors' calculations using 2001 survey data and 1999 accounting data. This is a log-log regression of respondent's report of the value of his or her TIAA-CREF assets on actual accounting data for the respondent. For both the under-65 universe and the regression sample, the data include only those who reported and had more than $10,000 in TIAA-CREF assets, with no immediate (payout) annuities, or TIAA-CREF IRAs, and whose reported age and gender matched the age and gender recorded in the TIAA-CREF database. For the universe, 738 observations are included in this regression; the R 2 is .958; root MSE is 0.247. For the regression sample, 381 observations are included, the R 2 is .968; root MSE is 0.214. Gustman and Steinmeier [2001] document far larger discrepancies between the pension bene ts reported by respondents to the HRS and a careful estimate of the bene ts that these same respondents have accumulated based on administrative records.
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In the regressions that follow, unless otherwise indicated, we calculate net worth and gross nancial assets using self-reported data for all asset categories, including TIAA-CREF assets. In Section V we report the results of regressions in which we replace self-reported TIAA-CREF asset total with accounting data (and in which we restrict the sample to avoid the obvious cases described above in which the TIAA-CREF data are likely to be inappropriate). In the context of that analysis, we provide a more detailed discussion of the various possible reasons for differences between the accounting data and the self-reports.
V. WEALTH AND PLANNING: THE CORRELATION
V.A. De ning Financial Planning
To highlight our interest in nancial planning, our questions on this subject were placed at the very beginning of the survey, preceded by the statement:
We are interested in your behavior related to planning for your household's long-term nancial future, and the types of advice (if any) you may have used in developing your nancial plan.
We used two different approaches to measuring nancial planning, based, respectively, on the input and output sides of the planning activity. With respect to the input side, we asked survey participants to respond to the following general statement:
c Question 1a: I have spent a great deal of time developing a nancial plan. Answers to this question and to many other questions on the survey were placed on a qualitative 1-6 scale. Survey participants were asked to indicate which of six statements (1 5 disagree strongly, 2 5 disagree, 3 5 disagree somewhat, 4 5 agree somewhat, 5 5 agree, 6 5 agree strongly) best characterized their reaction to the assertion.
With respect to the output side, we asked households a yes/no question concerning their preparation of a clearly de ned nancial plan.
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c Question 2a: Have you personally gathered together your household's nancial information, reviewed it in detail, and formulated a speci c nancial plan for your household's long-term future? [yes/no] Those who replied in the af rmative were asked also to specify the age at which this activity was rst undertaken, since one might expect the impact of planning on wealth to depend on how long one has had that plan in place. In regressions based on this second measure, we include both an indicator for whether or not a plan has been developed, and a measure of the time for which any such plan has been in place.
Answers to questions 1a and 2a are presented in Table IV . The majority of respondents agreed (to some degree) that they had spent a great deal of time developing a nancial plan, and at the same time claimed to have put together just such a detailed plan. The correlation between these two measures of planning in our regression sample is 0.48. Overall, it appears that our sample is far more involved with long-term planning than are their counterparts in the HRS, where only one-third of respondents claimed to have given a lot of thought to retirement, even though all of them are within ten years of retiring. In addition, our households are relatively homogeneous, wealthy, and well-educated. Despite these differences, Lusardi's insight generalizes: nancial planning and wealth accumulation are strongly positively correlated. Table V presents simple reduced-form regressions of wealth on planning and exogenous household characteristics. Our wealth measure w is either net worth or gross nancial assets. The planning measure p is question 1a. The vector x of exogenous individual characteristics includes variables familiar from standard life-cycle regressions, including gender, marital status, and number of children. We also include information on earnings in 1998 and expected earnings from 2005 along with age and earnings in 1999 to control for the life-cycle pattern of earnings. Natural logarithms of the earnings measures are used in the regressions; for respondents reporting zero earnings, the log measure is given a value of 0, and a corresponding dummy variable is set to 1. We include a separate set of dummies for household retirement status (working, semiretired, fully retired). We use age and age squared to control for the humped-shaped pattern of wealth accumulation. Measures of education and occupation are also included in x to provide additional controls for past and future earnings. Finally, since de ned contribution pensions are included in our measure of wealth, but de ned bene t pensions are not, we include a dummy for households reporting one or more de ned bene t pension plans. In what follows, we refer to this set of x variables as "the standard controls."
Our central nding is that the correlation of planning with both net worth and gross nancial assets is positive and highly statistically signi cant. With respect to the economic signi cance of the correlation with planning, the standard deviation of the answer to question 1a in this sample is around 1.2. Given the coef cients on question 1a in Table V , this implies that a onestandard-deviation increase in the answer to the planning question is associated with roughly a 20 percent increase in net worth and in gross nancial assets.
With respect to key life-cycle variables, the regression coefcients in Table V are generally similar across the two regressions, and broadly consistent with the classical model of life-cycle saving. Both net worth and gross nancial assets are increasing and concave in age, increasing in current and past earnings, and little impacted by future earnings. As expected, possessing a de ned bene t plan tends to reduce wealth accumulation. The demographic controls, including the education and occupation dummies, tend to be insigni cant, with the notable exception of 1023 Dependent variables are natural logarithms of the quantities listed at head of each set of columns. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical con dence for rejection of the hypothesis that the relevant coef cient is (independently) equal to zero: *** indicates rejection at better than a 1 percent level of con dence; ** indicates rejection at better than a 5 percent level; and * indicates rejection at better than a 10 percent level.
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being single, divorced, or widowed, all of which are associated with less wealth accumulation than being married. 
V.C. Alternative Speci cations
The effect of planning survives when we change from an input to an output measure of planning. When we use the answers from question 2a in place of the input-based measure of question 1a as the p-variable, we nd that both having a plan and having that plan in place for a longer time are associated with higher net worth and gross nancial assets.
7
One arti cial feature of the regressions reported in Table V is that we treat the planning variable as continuous. When we replace this variable with dummy variables for each different level of planning, there is strict monotonicity in the estimated coef cients, and the variables are strongly jointly signi cant. A higher reported level of planning is always associated with higher levels of net worth and gross nancial assets.
A nal point to note about our questions is that, while they measure strictly personal characteristics, we use them in regressions for household wealth. To assess the importance of this distinction, we asked two questions on the survey designed to gauge the importance of the respondent in household nancial and spending decisions. These questions concerned the extent to which the respondent took the lead in making investment decisions and spending decisions in the household. Most respondents do appear to play a very signi cant role in household nancial decision-making: indeed a high level of nancial responsibility may have been viewed by responding households as an important determinant of who should ll out the questionnaire. At any rate our ndings concerning the effects of planning on wealth are unchanged if we restrict attention to those answering these ques-6. While the coef cients in these wealth regressions are not unusual, the high degree of explanatory power certainly is. Even when we remove planning, we get R 2 's of above 50 percent in both regressions. In contrast, wealth regressions in the HRS typically get R 2 's below 10 percent (e.g., Lusardi [1999] and Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg [2001] ). A small part of this is due to differences in sample de nition (e.g., the HRS focuses only on households close to retirement). However, the lion's share of the difference appears to be due to other distinctions between the data sets-in particular, the fact that we have more wealthy individuals in our sample. It is also likely that our sample is more homogeneous in the omitted variables.
7. For brevity, we do not provide a full report of these regressions. The results of all regressions that we summarize in the text but do not fully report are available from the authors upon request.
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tions in the af rmative. We conclude that our results are not signi cantly impacted by the respondent-household distinction.
VI. THE PROPENSITY TO PLAN
VI.A. Measuring the Propensity to Plan
To identify the effect of planning on wealth, we need a set of instruments, the z variables in equation (2). Our approach involves characterizing an individual's propensity to plan.
One hypothesis is that there are some individuals who are generally more inclined than others to plan, and that this inclination shows up in many aspects of their life. Question 3d was designed to measure this general propensity. We chose to ask a question about vacation planning, because it is a situation in which planning is important, without being obviously connected either with nancial planning per se, or with broad measures of long-term patience such as the long-term discount factor. As with all of the planning questions, the answers were on the 1-6 scale from disagree strongly to agree strongly.
c Question 3d: Before going on a vacation, I spend a great deal of time examining where I would most like to go and what I would like to do. Our second hypothesis takes the planning characteristic idea one step further. We hypothesize that the propensity to plan involves a somewhat broader desire for order and understanding. Question 3s was designed to measure this kind of fastidiousness.
c Question 3s: My workspace is generally very tidy. Our third and nal hypothesis concerns the speci c mental processes required to construct a nancial plan. More than other forms of planning, nancial planning calls for speci c skills in the area of numeracy. A nancial plan may be far easier to construct for one who is highly numerate than for one who has few computational skills. Questions 3e and 3q were designed to capture this hypothesis.
c Question 3e: I am highly con dent in my computer skills. c Question 3q: I am highly con dent in my mathematical skills. In the estimation that follows, we drop the questions concerning a tidy workspace and computer skills from the propensity to plan, since they are not signi cantly correlated with planning, either individually or jointly. 8 In contrast, the vacation planning and mathematical skills questions are very strongly connected to planning.
With respect to the empirical model outlined in equations (1) and (2) above, the key question is whether or not our instruments are correlated with the errors in the wealth equation. Inasmuch as these errors re ect true shocks to wealth, such as unanticipated bequests, it seems reasonable to assume that they are not.
The aspect of the orthogonality that is less easy to come to grips with concerns missing variables. It is highly unlikely that our empirical measure of the exogenous determinants of wealth, x, is complete. In particular, our measures of earning over the life cycle are incomplete. Hence our instruments may be compromised to the extent that they are correlated with an unmeasured component of lifetime income. In this respect, we go a long way by including measures of current, lagged, and expected future income, as well as dummy variables for education and occupation. It is notable that the correlation between vacation planning and current earnings is statistically and economically insigni cant. Even mathematical skills are not highly correlated with earnings in our sample. The correlation in the regression sample is only 0.09. Hence even with our imperfect measure of lifetime earnings, our identifying assumptions do not seem unreasonable. 
VI.B. Estimation
We estimate our model (equations (1) and (2) above) via two-stage least squares. As in the last section, our wealth measure w is either net worth or gross nancial assets. The planning measure p is question 1a. The vector x of exogenous individual characteristics comprises the standard controls. Our instruments z are the math skills and vacation planning questions above.
Table VI presents the rst-stage results (equation (2)). The central result is that both instruments are signi cant predictors of planning. The F-statistic for the joint signi cance of the two z 8. While question 3e on computer skills is not signi cantly correlated with question 1a, the input-based measure of planning, it is signi cantly correlated with question 2a, the output-based measure. This suggests that computer skills increase the productivity of time spent developing a nancial plan. 9. A different argument concerning incompleteness is addressed in Section VII below, in which we explore the impact of classical preference parameters such as the discount factor on both planning and wealth accumulation. Dependent variable in the regression above is the answer to Question 1a, degree of agreement (1 5 Disagree strongly, 2 5 Disagree, 3 5 Disagree somewhat, 4 5 Agree somewhat, 5 5 Agree, 6 5 Agree strongly) with the statement "I have spent a great deal of time developing a nancial plan." Asterisks indicate the level of statistical con dence for rejection of the hypothesis that the relevant coef cient is (independently) equal to zero: *** indicates rejection at better than a 1 percent level of con dence; ** indicates rejection at better than a 5 percent level; and * indicates rejection at better than a 10 percent level.
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variables is in excess of 13, and the hypothesis that both are zero is rejected at the .0001 level.
Table VII presents the second-stage results (equation (1)). Dependent variables are natural logarithms of the quantities listed at head of each set of columns. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical con dence for rejection of the hypothesis that the relevant coef cient is (independently) equal to zero: *** indicates rejection at better than a 1 percent level of con dence; ** indicates rejection at better than a 5 percent level; and * indicates rejection at better than a 10 percent level.
The central result is that a 2 , the coef cient on planning, is still positive, statistically signi cant, and larger than its OLS value.
10
Other coef cients are fairly close to their OLS values of the last section. As a basic speci cation test, we perform a BasmanSargan test of the overidentifying restrictions. In neither case do we reject the overidentifying restrictions at the 5 percent level (8 percent for net worth, 12 percent for gross nancial assets).
With respect to the economic signi cance of the planning effect, our estimate of a 2 implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in planning (1.2 points) should give rise to a 39 percent increase in net worth or a 48 percent increase in gross nancial assets.
VI.C. Alternative Speci cations
The broad result is unchanged when we replace question 1a with question 2a as the measure of planning. When we perform this regression, we measure planning using both a dummy variable de ning whether or not there is a comprehensive plan, and a nonnegative variable measuring the length of time for which any such plan has been in effect. In both the net worth and the gross nancial assets regressions, we again nd that those with a higher propensity to plan accumulate more wealth. The hypothesis that the coef cients on the planning variables are both zero is rejected at the 5 percent level.
As in the reduced-form regressions of Section V, we test the importance of our assumption of linearity given that several of the variables we use are in fact discrete. We reestimate the system using dummy variables for the different levels of each instrument. We nd that the impact of each instrument on planning is monotonically increasing in the expected direction. The only exception to monotonicity occurs in the comparison between those who "disagree somewhat" and those who "agree somewhat" that they spend a lot of time planning for vacations (this difference is statistically insigni cant). We also reestimate the model using two different transformations of the left-hand side planning variable, one a concave transformation (square-root) and the other convex (quadratic). Our results are essentially unchanged, although statistical signi cance in the second stage is slightly 10. The increase in the coef cient on planning when we instrument is supportive of the view that exogenous increases in wealth reduce planning. However, we cannot reject the alternative interpretation that instrumenting simply reduces measurement error in planning.
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higher for the quadratic version of planning and slightly lower for the square-root version. We also reestimate our basic model including only age and gender as independent exogenous variables. Our results are again little changed: the coef cients on the instruments in the rst stage remain large and statistically signicant, and the coef cient on the planning variable rises to .43 in the net worth second-stage regression, and .49 for gross nancial assets, and is signi cant at better than the 1 percent level in both cases. Gale [1999] has raised important questions concerning the economic as opposed to the statistical signi cance of Lusardi's ndings concerning the wealth-planning relationship. One of the issues he raised is that for the households in the HRS, unmeasured social security wealth is the dominant source of retirement income. This wealth is largely independent of planning. Even if planning has a large effect on these households' non-Social Security wealth, the effect on total wealth and on total consumption may be far smaller due to the buffering effect of Social Security. This objection is far less powerful for our sample, for whom Social Security income forms a far smaller share of total retirement income. Gale's second question concerns whether the effect of planning, large as it may be in percentage terms, may nevertheless be very small in dollar terms. This would be true if the effect of planning was signi cant only for those with low levels of wealth. However, when we repeat our net worth IV regression for the 300 households in the regression sample with net worth between $50,000 and $750,000, the coef cient on instrumented planning rises to .40, signi cant at the 2 percent level. When we do likewise for the gross asset IV regression for the 315 sample households with gross nancial assets between $50,000 and $750,000, the coef cient on instrumented planning falls slightly to .363, signi cant at the 3 percent level.
VI.D. Using TIAA-CREF Accounting Data
We repeat the above analysis substituting TIAA-CREF accounting data for the self-reported TIAA-CREF data for those households for whom this is not a clearly inappropriate substitution. As pointed out in Section II above, inaccuracies are to be expected when the household owns a particular type of IRA at TIAA-CREF, and in cases in which both partners in a household have TIAA-CREF assets and the self-reported data refer to a different individual than do the accounting data. When we rule out these cases, our sample size falls from 500 to 438.
The change in sample per se makes very little difference to our results when we use the self-reported data for wealth and net worth. Yet the results change somewhat when we replace the self-reported measure of wealth with the accounting data in the net worth and gross nancial assets regressions. In particular, there is a reduction in the coef cient on planning in both the simple OLS regressions and the IV regressions. The coef cient in the net worth IV regression falls to .237, and is signi cant at the 9 percent level. The coef cient in the gross nancial assets IV regression falls to .217, and is signi cant at the 11 percent level.
What accounts for the differences between the results based on the self-reports and the results based on the accounting data? To answer this with any degree of con dence, we would rst have to know why the two numbers differ. There are at least three candidate explanations. One candidate is simple random misreporting, in which survey respondents make random errors in reporting their TIAA-CREF asset total. A second candidate is miscategorization, in which an error in the reported TIAA-CREF total corresponds to an equal and opposite error in another asset category.
11 A third candidate is that the accounting data and the self-reported data may refer to different dates. On the front of the survey, it is stated that all asset information should be accurate as of December 31, 1999, and this is the date of the accounting information we use. Yet in the body of the SPF, respondents were asked to provide the "current value" of their holdings of various assets. In essence, one might expect answers to this question for each asset to refer to some recent date, rather than to December 31, 1999. Indeed, given that signi cant numbers of survey responses were received in February 2000, the actual number may even be more up-to-date.
12
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to sort out which of the above explanations for the difference between the self-reports 11. For example, while the survey makes clear that supplemental retirement assets were to be included in the total of "employer-sponsored" accounts, it would be easy to understand a miscategorization in which the respondent treated them instead as IRAs, since there may be no employer contribution in some types of plans.
12. The issue of timing is especially important given the signi cant role of equities in the TIAA-CREF portfolios of the survey respondents, and the fact that accumulation unit values for the various CREF equity-based accounts varied from their end-millennium values by some 5 percent-10 percent in the weeks surrounding December 31, 1999.
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and accounting data is closest to the truth. The best that we can do at this stage is to investigate the impact of planning for those who make the smallest errors, and therefore for whom the ndings should be less dependent on which source of data we use. Table VIII summarizes the results of regressions in which we restrict the sample to households for whom the difference between self-reported and accounting data is relatively small. Speci cally, the sample includes only those households for whom this difference is either under $10,000 in absolute value, or re ects less than a 10 percent difference in the TIAA-CREF balance. With this restriction, differences larger than 10 percent are allowed only if they are small in absolute terms (e.g., rounding down from $100 to $0), and large absolute errors are allowed only if they are small in proportionate terms (e.g., $15,000 of accounts totaling $250,000). This restriction reduces the sample from 438 to 361 households.
As the table shows, the coef cients on planning in these regressions are very close to the coef cients reported in Table VII . In fact, the coef cients in the net worth regressions are slightly higher than in Table VII , and in all four regressions in Table VIII , statistical signi cance is at or around the 5 percent level. In the rst-stage regression (which is the same for all four of the regressions) the coef cients on question 3d and question 3q are little changed from their values in the full regression sample, and they Tables VI and VII . For brevity, other coef cients are omitted from the table above, but are included in the underlying regressions. These regressions include only the 361 individuals in the regression sample whose self-reported age and gender match the accounting data, who have no TIAA-CREF IRAs, and for whom either (1) the absolute difference between self-reported TIAA-CREF balances and the TIAA-CREF accounting data is $10,000 or less, or (2) the absolute log difference between self-reported TIAA-CREF balances and the TIAA-CREF accounting data is .10 log points or less. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical con dence for rejection of the hypothesis that the relevant coef cient is (independently) equal to zero: *** indicates rejection at better than a 1 percent level of con dence; ** indicates rejection at better than a 5 percent level; and * indicates rejection at better than a 10 percent level.
have a joint F-statistic of 8.37, signi cant at the .0003 level. Finally, the second-stage regressions underlying Table VIII all pass tests of the overidentifying restrictions.
VII. THE ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
The results of the last section are obviously consistent with the propensity to plan theory outlined in Section II. However, they are entirely inconsistent with another of the theories there outlined: the reverse causation theory. If the correlation between wealth and planning was entirely due to the impact of wealth on planning, we should have estimated a 2 5 0 in equation (1) above.
What of the other two theories outlined in Section II: the preference parameter theory and the uncertainty reduction theory? In principle, these theories may explain our results. In this section we provide evidence against these channels, thereby buttressing the case for planning.
VII.A. Preference Parameters
The key implication of the preference parameter theory is that these parameters should be included in our measure of x, the exogenous individual characteristics affecting both wealth and planning behavior in equations (1) and (2) above. If the theory is correct, and the preference parameters are well-measured, their coef cients should be signi cant in the wealth regression (1), while at the same time reducing to insigni cance the impact of planning in the wealth equation. In order to test this theory, we add to the list of x-variables from the last section additional survey-based measures of four of the key preference parameters from the classical life-cycle model: the discount factor, the bequest motive, the level of risk aversion, and the precautionary motive.
Our measures of all key preference parameters derive from a series of hypothetical choice question of the type introduced by Barsky et al. [1997] . The precise questions that we posed are recorded in the Appendix.
As detailed in the Appendix, the discount rate and the bequest motive are both derived from the answer to a question concerning the respondent's ideal pattern of spending. The bequest motive re ects the ideal allocation of resources to heirs and bene ciaries. The discount rate re ects the ideal division of spending between ages 50 -64 relative and ages 65-79. Many of the answers to this question had to be discarded as unreasonable (e.g., assigning nothing to the rst fteen years). Among those that were reasonable, we nd a general preference for equal consumption in the two life periods (in fact, more than 40 percent of respondents allocate an equal amount to each period). Yet there is substantial variation around this happy medium.
With respect to risk aversion, we measure this using both a qualitative question and a quantitative question concerning preferences among lotteries. In the regressions that follow, we use only the qualitative measure, since the quantitative measure seems to contain little, if any, additional information. Finally, our measure of the precautionary motive asks respondents to specify how an increase in the uncertainty of future income would impact their spending out of current income. As in the case of risk aversion, we asked not only for a qualitative answer concerning the direction of change, but also for quantitative information concerning how much additional money they would spend or save. We use the quantitative answer in the regressions that follow. Table IX shows the impact on the crucial coef cients of including our preference parameters as additional right-hand side variables in our model. One important point to note is the signicant reduction in sample size. Rather than 500 observations, the sample contains only 316 observations. The primary reason for this is the large number of individuals whose answer concerning the preference for future consumption was discarded as unreasonable.
The most signi cant observation concerning the results of this regression is that our estimate of a 2 , the coef cient on planning in the wealth regression, is somewhat higher than in the regression without preference parameters. In addition, there is absolutely no loss of statistical signi cance, despite the fall in sample size. Finally, our instruments are still strongly jointly signi cant in the rst stage. These results appear to contradict the preference parameter theory. According to this theory, a 2 should lose signi cance once the preference parameters are included.
13
The power of our result depends on how accurate are our survey measures of preference parameters. In this respect, it is 13. Our results on the signi cance of planning, and of the various parameters in the analysis are basically unchanged when we add them to the regression either one at a time, or in various other combinations. notable that preference for future consumption, the precautionary motive, and the bequest motive all show up as insigni cant in the wealth regression. However, there are striking ndings concerning the impact of the bequest motive on planning and on wealth accumulation. The bequest motive has a signi cant positive impact on planning, and has a separate positive impact on wealth accumulation. Those with higher bequest motives accumulate more not only because of their greater concern with the size of their bequest, but also because the desire to leave a bequest induces higher planning. Since this has a ring of truth to it, it is all the more notable that inclusion of the bequest motive There were 316 observations used in all regressions. For the second-stage regressions (top two panels), the dependent variables are natural logarithms of the given wealth measures (net worth in the top panel, and gross nancial assets in the middle panel). See the text for a description of the construction of the preference measures. Other right-hand-side variables included the same controls as in our basic speci cation: current, past, and future income measures; age and age squared; number of children; and indicators for employment status, occupation, education, marital status, gender and participation in a DB plan (respondent and spouse). For brevity, these coef cients are not reported above. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical con dence for rejection of the hypothesis that the relevant coef cient is (independently)equal to zero: *** indicates rejection at better than a 1 percent level of con dence; ** indicates rejection at better than a 5 percent level; and * indicates rejection at better than a 10 percent level.
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did not in any way reduce the impact of the propensity to plan on wealth accumulation.
VII.B. Planning and Uncertainty Reduction
The two channels through which a planning-induced reduction in uncertainty might in uence wealth accumulation involve, respectively, reduced uncertainty about future income, and reduced uncertainty about future asset returns. We take these up in turn.
The hypothesis that the relationship between planning and wealth accumulation can be explained by the resulting changes in uncertainty concerning future income is a joint hypothesis on the formation of beliefs and on the precautionary motive. It requires both that planning reduce uncertainty, and that this reduction in uncertainty increase wealth accumulation. The data suggest that while the hypothesis on beliefs may be valid, that on the precautionary motive is false.
The survey has several questions relating to income uncertainty. In fact, all of our questions in which we asked for estimates of future variables followed a statement that made explicit our interest in the dispersion of beliefs.
14 Following this statement, we obtained estimates of future income from employment as well as future income from Social Security in various years. While the results are not entirely clear-cut, there is some evidence that those with a high propensity to plan indeed have lower subjective uncertainty concerning future income, in particular Social Security income.
15
Despite this, there is no reason to believe that this reduction in uncertainty explains their higher level of wealth. Speci cally, the answers to our question on precautionary saving reveal that 14. The precise statement was as follows: "Because of the uncertainty that is inherent in any question about your nancial future, the following questions ask you to provide three estimates: c a LOW estimate, where you are 90 percent sure that the correct answer is above this number c your CLOSEST estimate of the most accurate answer c a HIGH estimate, where you are 90 percent sure the correct answer is below this number." 15. Speci cally, the average distance between the high and low estimates for Social Security income among those who indicated agreement or strong agreement to the basic planning question (Q1a) was roughly $7,000, while for all other respondents to the planning question, this was $10,000. Even controlling for age, the average distance between the high and low estimates for Social Security income is signi cantly narrower among the "high planners." the vast majority of our sample would respond to an increase in uncertainty by saving more. Only 4 of 488 respondents to the precautionary planning question would save less, while 286 would save more. The planning-induced reduction in uncertainty better explains a negative impact of planning on wealth than vice versa.
Turning now to equity effects, does planning increase stock market participation, and thereby increase wealth accumulation? It turns out that this channel has no power whatsoever in our sample. More than 90 percent of the households in our regression sample own stocks, so that the extensive margin plays no role in our results. If we limit our analysis to agents who own stock, the coef cient on planning is virtually unchanged.
Could it be that planners simply hold more stocks and that the dramatic rise in stock prices explains the increased wealth? The answer is no. On average, stocks make up approximately 63 percent of nancial assets in our regression sample. Even those who report low planning levels have 60 percent of their nancial wealth in equities. If we regress the share of stocks in nancial assets on instrumented planning and controls, planning is insigni cant. Finally, if planning affected wealth through stock holding, we might expect including stock holding in the planning regression to reduce the effect of planning on wealth. We therefore included stock holding in the IV planning regressions. While the stock share is positively correlated with net worth and gross nancial assets, the coef cient on planning remains essentially unchanged in both regressions. In our sample, stock holding does not appear to explain the effect of planning on wealth.
The fact that portfolio differences are not enough to explain the observed wealth differences in our nding connects to a broader nding of Venti and Wise [2000] . In their analysis of households in the HRS, they found that controlling for observed portfolio choice did little to explain observed wealth differences at retirement among households with similar levels of lifetime income. In combination with additional ndings concerning the limited impact of bequests and other "shocks" on observed wealth differences, this led them to conclude that the bulk of the explanation for wealth differences must lie in differences in choices concerning how much to save. It is to this channel we now turn. We look for evidence on whether or not those with a high propensity to plan save more than those with a low such propensity.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
VIII. THE PROPENSITY TO PLAN: SAVING AND BUDGETING
The results of Section VI above establish our two primary hypotheses: that there are individual differences in the propensity to plan, and that these differences are associated with differences in wealth accumulation. The results of Sections VII suggest strongly that there is some nonclassical channel in operation, and that this channel is not related to asset holdings. In this section we present further af rmative evidence on the mechanisms underlying the impact of the propensity to plan and wealth accumulation.
Our rst nding points to a positive relationship between the propensity to plan and the rate of savings: those with a high propensity to plan appear to save more. This brings to mind the "effortful self-control" theory of Section II. To gain further insight, we explore the links between the propensity to plan and the keeping of household budgets. We nd that those with a high propensity to plan set more detailed budgets. We nd also that many who keep such budgets regard this activity as helping to keep their spending under control.
VIII.A. Savings and the Propensity to Plan
It is very dif cult to measure savings with any degree of accuracy in a survey. The correct economic de nition of income includes all income from assets including capital gains, as well as employer contributions to pension plans. Yet this is not the commonsense de nition of income. Similarly, the terms consumption and expenditure may mean different things to the average person than they do to an economist (for example, an economist would not include principal payments on a debt as expenditure, while the average person probably would).
Given these de nitional dif culties, our approach was to ask a straightforward question relating to income from employment in comparison with expenditures, and then to use our other data to try to make appropriate adjustments. We asked households the following question: c Question 13: On average over the past ve years has your total household spending (i.e., all spending including debt or mortgage payments) been more or less than the after-tax income that your household has received from employment? (In other words, did you spend more than your income from employment and rely on other nancial assets to cover your household spending, or did you spend less and rely solely on your employment income?) Of the households in the universe who answered this question, 63 percent reported that income exceeded spending, 21 percent reported that spending exceeded income, while the remaining 16 percent reported income equal to expenditure.
Our interest is in whether the propensity to plan appears to play a signi cant role in determining the qualitative answer to this question. In a rst cut, we include the same controls as in the wealth regressions. The sample expands to 915 due to the fact that we no longer require a comprehensive measure of wealth. The coef cient on instrumented planning is positive in this regression, and signi cant at the 3 percent level. Those with a high propensity to plan are more likely to be saving in the sense of question 13.
Because there may be differences between the answers to question 13 and the true economic de nition of saving, we use the detailed nancial information in our survey to control for possible discrepancies. On the income side, question 13 excludes asset income and is likely to exclude employer contributions to de ned bene t plans; we therefore include these two variables in the regression. We measure income from assets using data from the SPF which distinguishes income from employment, income from savings and investments, income from rental properties, as well as income from all forms of pension (unfortunately, we have no measure of capital gains). We also have data from the SPF on employer contributions to all de ned contribution pension plans as a proportion of employment income. On the expenditure side, question 13 instructs households to include all mortgage payments in spending, yet the repayment of principal should be counted in savings. Since we do not have a breakdown of mortgage payments between principal and interest, we do the next best thing and use the SPF to measure the ratio of total mortgage payments to income from employment. When we include these three constructed variables and the controls together with instrumented planning in our savings regression, the sample shrinks to 321 households. However, the coef cient on instrumented planning remains positive (it is actually higher in this regression than in the larger regression), and is signi cant at the 6 percent level.
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A household that monitors its spending more closely may be better able to keep its spending under control. Such monitoring behaviors may be more closely related to short-term budgeting than they are to long-term nancial planning. To look for insight on this issue, respondents were asked to use the previously described 1 to 6 scale to re ect on the applicability of the following statement concerning their budgeting behavior:
c Question 3i: My household regularly sets a detailed budget for our overall spending. What is the relationship between budgeting and planning? Budgeting is less prevalent in our regression sample than is nancial planning. Some 37 percent of households in the under-65 universe agree to any degree that they keep a budget. In contrast, 65 percent agree to some degree that they spent a great deal of time developing a nancial plan. Despite this difference, budgeting and planning are highly correlated. In addition, changes in the propensity to plan have a strong impact on budgeting. When the propensity to plan increases, it has just as strong an effect on budgeting as it does on planning itself.
Even if it is true that the propensity to plan has a strong in uence on budgeting, it is not immediately evident that this has any relevance to our results on savings and wealth accumulation. We asked one additional question with a view to advancing our understanding of this issue. Our question re ects the following commonsense observation. The everyday de nition of budgeting involves not only the keeping of a nancial plan, but also the use of that plan as a device to help cut back on spending. We asked the following question designed to assess how many households had in mind this commonsense notion of "belt-tightening" in their de nition of budgeting.
c Question 3j: If my household were to never set a budget, our spending would rise a great deal. It was up to the respondents themselves to decide whether or not they set a budget and hence should respond to the question. Of particular interest are the responses to question 3j for the 37 percent of sample households whose responses to question 3i were 4 or above (i.e., those who agreed at least to some extent that they set a detailed spending budget). These responses reveal an even split, with almost 50 percent of responses indicating some form of agreement: 6 percent agreeing strongly, 15 percent un-equivocally agreeing, and 24 percent agreeing only somewhat. A substantial minority of sample households agree that their budgeting activities help them to restrain their spending.
VIII.C. Budgeting in the Wealth Regressions
The results of the last section suggest a channel whereby the propensity to plan raises households' ability to tighten their belts, thereby raising savings and wealth accumulation. If this is an important part of the story, then it is of interest to repeat our analysis of planning and wealth using budgeting in place of planning. When we do this, we immediately identify a qualitative difference. In reduced-form regressions there is a negative relationship between the budgeting variable and both net worth and gross nancial assets (in both cases, there is signi cance at better than a 10 percent level). This is quite the opposite of the ndings with nancial planning. Controlling for other factors, higher levels of wealth are associated with lower levels of budgeting.
What happens when we replace planning in our two-equation system of Section V with budgeting? We use the same z variables to measure the "propensity to budget" as were used to measure the propensity to plan: vacation planning (question 3d) and math con dence (question 3q). Table X presents the results of the resulting wealth regressions, using, respectively, net worth and gross nancial assets as left-hand-side variables. In the common rst-stage regression the F-statistic for the joint signi cance of questions 3d and 3q is above 13.
The coef cients on budgeting in both wealth regressions are positive. While the sizes of the coef cients and their signi cance levels are lower than was found for planning in the planning regressions, the results are possibly more surprising in light of the negative association between budgeting and wealth in the reduced-form OLS regressions. The IV regression estimates for budgeting are both signi cantly different from the reduced-form estimates at the 5 percent level. When we limit attention to those households with net worth between $50,000 and $750,000, the effect of instrumented budgeting on net worth is signi cantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, and that on gross nancial assets is signi cant at the 10 percent level. These ndings suggest that our instruments are doing more than simply reducing measurement error in budgeting. In fact, the results suggest that the feedback effect from wealth to budgeting is negative, possibly because those who are exogenously wealthier 1042
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may not need to watch their spending so closely. Finally, when we replace instrumented planning with instrumented budgeting in the savings regression of Section VI, the coef cients and their 
